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Note
Rethinking Off-Label Regulation in the Wake of
Sorrell v. IMS Health: Can State Involvement
Compensate for Waning FDA Authority to Curb
Commercial Free Speech?
Ashley A. Zborowsky*
Off-label promotion and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA, the Agency) current restrictions on commercial “free speech” have garnered much attention in recent years
due to a district court ruling in United States v. Caronia1 and a
subsequent Supreme Court decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health.2
United States v. Caronia is currently pending review in the Second Circuit following Sorrell—a highly anticipated ruling. The
outcome of the Caronia case could have a staggering effect on
FDA regulatory authority with respect to promotional activity,
and has been the topic of much scholarly debate. However,
First Amendment rights and commercial free speech are not
novel issues in the context of pharmaceutical and device law.
While many entities have challenged the constitutionality of
FDA’s ban on off-label promotion, in and out of the courtroom,
deference to Agency interpretations of relevant provisions of
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) has enabled FDA to
recover billions of dollars in penalties from manufacturers for
off-label promotional activities.3
Off-label promotion is, essentially, the act of marketing or
promoting regulated products for uses other than those ap© 2012 Ashley A. Zborowsky
* Law Student at the University of Minnesota Law School. The author
would like to thank Professor Ralph Hall, Brandon McDonough, and Terri
Zborowsky for their thoughtful editing and feedback.
1. United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
2. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
3. George S. Craft, Jr., Promoting Off-Label in Pursuit of Profit: An Examination of a Fraudulent Business Model, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 103,
108–120 (2007) (discussing the scope of both civil and criminal penalties in recent off-label and false claims enforcement).
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proved by the FDA.4 Because the Court in Sorrell clearly establishes that pharmaceutical marketing is a form of protected
speech,5 the FDA must consider other regulatory pathways to
ensure the safety and efficacy of regulated products. The implications of the Sorrell decision will not be fully understood until
it is applied by lower courts, and a thorough analysis of its
holding is outside the scope of this Note. Still, legal scholars
and industry actors have posited that, in the wake of Sorrell,
FDA authority to regulate off-label promotion may be waning.6
However, the Agency’s off-label ban is rooted in its longstanding mission to safeguard public health—for this reason, there
remains a strong governmental interest in this issue that
should be addressed.
This Note explores the regulatory landscape relative to offlabel promotion and proposes alternatives to current FDA practices. Part I provides an overview of these practices and discusses physician autonomy to prescribe off-label. Part II discusses why other proposed alternatives to curtail off-label use—
such as reimbursement—are insufficient to address the problem. Finally, Part III contemplates how state attempts at regulating the practice of medicine may provide a viable alternative
to current regulatory uncertainties under the FDA. This Note
concludes that state-level involvement, namely, by regulating
off-label prescribing, may be the most effective way to ensure
regulated products are used only for their approved indications.

4. See, e.g., Randall Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use—
Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1428 (2008).
Manufacturing entities seeking regulatory approval must submit clinical data
demonstrating the safety and effectiveness of a given product for a particular
use. See id. at 1427. The product itself does not gain regulatory approval overall; rather, it receives approval for a specific indication or use—the treatment
of hypertension for example. See id. Any use of the product outside of the approved indication(s) borne on the product label can be considered “off-label.”
See id.
5. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659 (“Speech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.”).
6. See, e.g., Analysis of US Supreme Court’s Holding that a Ban on Sales
of Prescription Drug Information Violates the First Amendment, BAKER BOTTS
(June 30, 2011), http://www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/2011JunLifeSciences
SorrellVsIMSPage2.htm (addressing the issue of First Amendment rights in
the context of Caronia and Sorrell).
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I. OVERVIEW OF OFF-LABEL PROMOTION, REGULATION,
AND PENALTIES
A. FDA REGULATION OF OFF-LABEL PROMOTION
The FDCA does not directly prohibit off-label promotion.
Rather, two related statutory provisions indirectly provide authority for this ban. Section 355(a) of the FDCA prevents manufacturers from introducing a new product into interstate
commerce that has not yet secured FDA approval.7 Marketing a
drug or device for any use other than that for which it has been
approved (including no use at all) violates this provision.8 Further, section 352(a) prohibits manufacturers from introducing
into interstate commerce any “misbranded” drug or device.9 A
product is considered misbranded if its label contains any false
or misleading information or lacks sufficient information to
support safe use.10 Advertising and promotional materials can
be considered part of a product’s label if distributed by the
manufacturer for purposes of explaining its use.11 The promotional material need not physically accompany the sale of the
product and may also take the form of verbal representations.12
However, once a product has gained FDA approval, it can
be prescribed to treat any illness or disease state regardless of
its approved indication(s).13 Approximately twenty-one percent

7. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
8. See id.; see also Krista Hessler Carver, A Global View of the First
Amendment Constraints on FDA, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 167 (2008) (“According to the FDA, manufacturer promotion for an off-label use constitutes
misbranding (because the product is not labeled for the promoted intended
use).”).
9. 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2006). Introducing an adulterated or misbranded
drug into interstate commerce is considered a “prohibited act” under the statute. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2006).
10. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) & (f) (2006); see also Carver, supra note 8, at 156–
57.
11. See Carver, supra note 8, at 163–165; see also Michelle M. Mello et al.,
Shifting Terrain in the Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceuticals,
360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1558 (2009) (“Printed and visual materials are
considered part of a drug’s labeling if they are distributed by the manufacturer
for the purpose of explaining the uses of the drug, even if they are not packaged with the drug.”).
12. Mello, supra note 11.
13. James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J.

015 ZBOROWSKY_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

928

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

7/5/2012 1:29 PM

[Vol. 13:2

of all prescriptions are prescribed for off-label uses.14 Off-label
use, in many instances, generates the most sales for a given
product.15 This is often the case in the field of pediatric medicine, where an estimated sixty-two percent of all outpatient
prescriptions are used off-label for children.16 Therefore, the
impetus for off-label promotion is derived from the discretion of
physicians to act autonomously in caring for their patients.17
Off-label prescribing raises concerns from a regulatory perspective, where FDA has been administratively charged with safeguarding public health and welfare.18
The governmental interest in a uniform approval process
for new drug and device indications is quite compelling. A new
product must be demonstrated as “safe and effective” with the
support of clinical evidence before it can be introduced into the
U.S. market. The ban on off-label promotion is intended to curtail widespread use of products that have not yet met this burden for a particular indication, and may or may not pose a risk
to public health. For this reason, the off-label ban seeks to incentivize clinical research to ensure optimal safety. However,
the length and expense associated with FDA’s current process
can effectively deter companies from seeking approval for additional efficacy indications.19 This is particularly true when offlabel use of a product becomes common medical practice.20
Where clinical trials to demonstrate safety and effectiveness

71, 76–77 (1998). Note that only manufacturers can promote for an off-label
use, and are subject to federal regulation of marketing activities. Physicians,
however, can prescribe for the same off-label use without consequence due to
state regulation of the practice of medicine.
14. Shopper Guide to Prescription Drugs: “Off-Label” Drug Use,
CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, 4–5 (2007) [hereinafter CONSUMERREPORTS], available
at
http://www.consumerreports.org/health/resources/pdf/best-buydrugs/money-saving-guides/english/Off-Label-FINAL.pdf (last visited Oct. 23,
2011).
15. See id.
16. Alicia T.F. Bazzano et al., Off-Label Prescribing to Children in the
United States Outpatient Setting, 9 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 81, 84 (2009).
17. Beck, supra note 13, at 72.
18. What We Do, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda
/whatwedo/default.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
19. See Stafford, supra note 4, at 1428 (arguing that off-label use may encourage manufacturers to “game the system”); see also Craft, supra note 3, at
103–31 (2007) (stating generally that off-label promotion is often the result of
a calculated and fraudulent business plan).
20. See Stafford, supra note 4, at 1427.
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would typically delay market entry, manufacturers of such
products have little incentive to pursue regulatory approval
once off-label use is pervasive and actively generating sales.21
As one scholar notes:
[T]he popularity of off-label uses has only increased in recent decades,
perhaps due in part to the rigorous and expensive nature of the approval process. The new drug approval process may cost hundreds of
millions of dollars. A discovery of a new use may occur after the drug
has exceeded or is near the end of its normal patent protection; thus,
the economic incentives for manufacturers to seek approval for new
drug uses when a drug has gone off-patent is significantly reduced.22

FDA has attempted to crack down on off-label activity in
recent years for this reason, imposing billion dollar penalties on
corporations that continue to engage in these practices.23 Most
notably, in 2009 Pfizer, Inc. paid an astounding $2.3 billion—
the largest criminal fine in U.S. history—for the off-label promotion of Bextra, a drug approved for the treatment of arthritis
and severe menstrual pain.24 The magnitude of this fine was
only eclipsed by the $16.8 billion in revenue generated by the
sale of Bextra from 2001–2008.25 Pfizer had previously been
charged with misbranding in 2002 for its off-label promotion of
the drug Neurontin.26 Less than a decade later, the recordbreaking penalties for Pfizer’s recidivism signaled a trend towards heightened regulatory scrutiny of corporate marketing
practices.27
Despite increases in penalties and criminal sanctions,
many manufacturers seem to view fines as a cost of doing business and continue to engage in off-label promotion simply because of the revenue it can generate.28 Arguably, current FDA
21. CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 14, at 1.
22. Briana R. Barron, Silent Warning: The FDA’s Ban on Off-label Speech:
Is It Protecting Our Safety? 94 MARQ. L. REV. 983, 989 (2011).
23. See, e.g., Craft, supra note 3, at 105–06.
24. David Evans, Pfizer Broke the Law by Promoting Drugs for Unapproved Uses, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a4yV1nYxCGoA.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Mark P. Walters, Medical Device Advertising to Receive Greater FDA
Scrutiny, FROMMER LAWRENCE & HAUG (Sept. 29, 2010), available at
http://www.fdalawyersblog.com/2010/09/medical-device-advertising-to.html
(“[E]xpanded CDRH staff will increase focus on advertising and promotion of
medical devices, specifically targeting ‘off-label’ claims made by medical practitioners.”).
28. Melly Alazraki, For Big Pharma, Is Breaking the Law the Price of Doing Business?, DAILYFINANCE (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.dailyfinance.com/sto
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practices are insufficient to curb such lucrative activities.29
Constitutional challenges to off-label regulation only frustrate
the existing regulatory scheme. Thus, where Sorrell and subsequent cases can be interpreted to authorize such contentious
practices on First Amendment grounds, it becomes imperative
that additional regulatory alternatives be explored.30
B. OFF-LABEL PROMOTION AS A FORM OF PROTECTED SPEECH
1. The Central Hudson Test
First Amendment challenges to FDA’s ban on off-label
speech prompted courts to apply the four-prong test set forth in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.31 The test requires courts to consider whether (1) the
speech concerns “lawful activity” that is not misleading, (2) “the
asserted government interest to be served by the restriction on
commercial speech is substantial,” then—if both of these conditions have been met—whether (3) “the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,” and (4) the regulation “is not more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest.”32 Commercial speech must be “inherently” rather
than “potentially” misleading.33
Applying this test, courts have concluded that off-label
speech concerns lawful activity as it relates to the underlying
conduct of physicians, who can prescribe off-label at their professional discretion—constituting a lawful activity.34 Though
this element of the first prong is satisfied as it pertains to offlabel promotion, FDA has consistently argued that off-label
ry/company-news/for-big-pharma-is-breaking-the-law-the-price-of-doing-busi
ness/19340271/.
29. See, e.g., Craft, supra note 3, at 122 (claiming that recent settlements
for off-label conduct indicate these activities are likely to persist).
30. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call
for Heightened Professional and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
476, 483 (2009) (arguing for further policy reform and congressional action as
needed “to deter inappropriate off-label prescribing”).
31. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980). The test espoused in Central Hudson has become the judicial
touchstone for evaluating whether government restrictions on commercial
speech violate the First Amendment generally—this includes off-label marketing activities. Id.
32. Id. at 557.
33. Barron, supra note 22, at 999–1000.
34. Id.
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speech is inherently misleading due to the fact that the Agency
has not yet evaluated nor approved the basis for such claims.35
Lower courts, however, have rejected this argument, and truthful, non-misleading speech regarding off-label use has been
held to satisfy the entire first prong of the Central Hudson
test.36
With respect to the second prong of the test, courts have
had to determine whether the government interest to be served
is substantial—arguably, this can be read as substantial
enough to justify the restriction on free speech.37 In the case of
off-label promotion, there are two related interests at stake—
the first is the integrity of the regulatory process itself, and the
second, is safeguarding the public health.38 The Supreme Court
in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center held that
“[p]reserving the new drug approval process is clearly an important governmental interest . . . .”39 However, while Western
States expressly acknowledged this interest as substantial, the
Court questioned FDA’s assertion that the ban on commercial
free speech is “‘not more extensive than is necessary to serve
[those] interest[s].’”40
To satisfy the third prong of Central Hudson, the government must demonstrate that the regulation at issue directly
advances its interest in a “‘material way.’” 41 In Western States,
FDA argued that its “premarket approval process, under which
manufacturers are required to put their proposed drugs
through tests of safety and effectiveness in order to obtain . . .
approval to market the drugs, is the best way to guarantee
drug safety and effectiveness.”42 Applied in the context of offlabel promotion, the ban could be construed to force compliance
with the established regulatory process so as to achieve the
Agency’s primary goal.43 However, the Court ultimately held
35. Id. at 1000.
36. Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C.
1998); see also Barron, supra note 22, at 1000 (detailing the application of Central Hudson to off-label promotion and commercial speech regulation).
37. Carver, supra note 8, at 173.
38. Barron, supra note 22, at 1001; see also Carver supra note 8, at 173.
39. Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 358 (2002).
40. Id. at 358–59 (alteration in original) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
41. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S.
761, 770–71 (1993)).
42. Western States, 535 U.S. at 369.
43. See Beck, supra note 13, at 84–85 (discussing the patient perceptions
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that—while the governmental interest in protecting the public
health is in fact substantial—the statute at issue did not directly advance this goal.44
With respect to the third and fourth prongs of the Central
Hudson test, other courts, however, have found that restriction
of manufacturers’ promotional activities is “one of the few
mechanisms available to FDA” to advance its regulatory
goals.45 Additionally, where the “drugs subject to FDA approval
are already in interstate commerce . . . the obvious restriction
on conduct is unavailable.”46 For these reasons, FDA has argued that there is no less restrictive means of curtailing offlabel conduct than to ban the speech that facilitates or encourages such conduct.47 Yet in Washington Legal Foundation v.
Friedman, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
court held that FDA restrictions were “considerably more extensive than necessary to further the substantial government
interest.”48 Similarly in Western States, the Court stated “[t]he
fact that ‘all of [these alternatives] could advance the Government’s asserted interest in a manner less intrusive to . . . First
Amendment rights’ indicated that the law was ‘more extensive
than necessary.’”49
Therefore, it is with the fourth prong of Central Hudson
that FDA’s ban on commercial speech has failed to pass constitutional muster.50 For example, though a settlement agreement
was ultimately reached, Allergan, Inc. recently argued in an
FDA enforcement action that “FDA has not provided exceptions
permitting communication of truthful medical evidence or oth-

of drugs being used off-label as either unapproved or disapproved).
44. Western States, 525 U.S. at 375. At issue in this case is § 127(a) of the
Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) restricting the advertising or promotion of compounded drugs, as compounds are exempted from
FDA’s standard drug approval process. Id. at 360.
45. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 72.
46. Id.
47. Western States, 525 U.S. at 368–71.
48. Friedman, 13 F.Supp.2d at 73.
49. Western States, 525 U.S. at 371–72 (alteration in original) (quoting
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995)). The Court in Western
States went on to find that the government interest “could be satisfied by the
far less restrictive alternative of requiring each compounded drug to be labeled
with a warning that the drug had not undergone FDA testing and that its
risks were unknown.” Id. at 376.
50. Barron, supra note 22, at 1003.
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erwise accommodating First Amendment concerns.”51 Conceivably, the suppression of truthful, non-misleading speech regarding off-label use of a product is far-reaching in its attempt
to regulate misuse of such products.52 Despite the fact that the
Agency has managed to dodge the proverbial bullet when it
comes to First Amendment challenges, existing case law is generally unfavorable. As such, FDA’s ban may not be sufficiently
“narrowly tailored” to survive First Amendment challenges,
particularly following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell.53
As noted by the Supreme Court in Western States, not all
regulation of commercial speech is unconstitutional.54 However,
the Court had yet to officially recognize speech related to
pharmaceutical marketing or promotion as entitled to First
Amendment protection until just last year in Sorrell.55
2. Recent Developments in First Amendment Jurisprudence:
Potential Implications of Sorrell v. IMS Health and United
States v. Caronia
On June 23, 2011, a six-three majority of the Supreme
Court struck down a Vermont law that restricted the “sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records . . . reveal[ing] the prescribing practices of individual doctors.”56 This process of
pharmaceutical promotion is referred to as “detailing.”57 The
Vermont Prescription Confidentiality Law of 2007 (Act 80) prohibited such disclosure practices without provider consent, subject only to the exception that prescriber-identifying information could be disseminated and used for specified purposes.58
By enacting this legislation, Vermont intended to impede man51. Memorandum of Law In Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction
at 12, Allergan v. United States, No. 09-1879 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct.1, 2009) (capitalization in original altered).
52. Barron, supra note 22, at 1002–03; see also Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the FDA and the First
Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection, 37 AM.
L.J. & MED. 315, 356 (2011) (“Whether it would be simpler . . . for the government to achieve its goal indirectly by suppressing protected speech is irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry. The suppression of fully protected, potentially valuable expression is far too high a price to pay for governmental
convenience.”).
53. See ROPES & GRAY, supra note, at 1.
54. Western States, 535 U.S. at 367.
55. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
56. Id.at 2659.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2660.
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ufacturers’ ability to sway providers towards brand-name drugs
in lieu of generic equivalents, thereby helping to reduce state
health care costs.59
Though the constitutional challenge to Act 80 was unsuccessful in district court, the Second Circuit overturned the ruling, holding that the statute “is a commercial speech restriction
that does not directly advance the substantial state interests
asserted by Vermont, and is not narrowly tailored to serve
those interests, the statute cannot survive intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson.”60 In his majority opinion, Justice
Kennedy affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit, noting
that the burden placed on protected expression is not justified
by the State’s asserted interest in physician confidentiality,
protecting doctors from “harassing” sales tactics, or protecting
the integrity of the physician-patient relationship.61 Further,
the statute did not permissibly advance the State’s goal of reducing health care costs.62 Lastly, the State offered no explanation as to why other available remedies—such as declining to
meet with “detailers”—would be inadequate.63 Justice Kennedy
also specifically noted that Vermont does not, in fact, contend
that the practice of detailing necessarily results in the dissemination of false or misleading information.64
The Court in Sorrell expressly stated that “[s]peech in aid
of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”65
The holding in this case may have a profound effect on FDA’s
ban of off-label promotion, despite the fact that the case concerns pharmaceutical marketing generally and does not specifically address FDA regulatory authority or off-label activity.66
According to legal analysts, the Sorrell decision is “likely to affect future court decisions about FDA’s ability to bar manufacturers from providing truthful information to physicians re-

59. Id. at 2661; see also ROPES & GRAY, supra note, at 1 (describing the
purpose of Act 80).
60. IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 267 (2nd Cir. 2010).
61. Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2669–70.
62. Id. at 2670–71.
63. Id. at 2669.
64. Id. at 2672.
65. Id. at 2659.
66. ROPES & GRAY, supra note, at 2.
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garding off-label uses of approved pharmaceutical products.”67
Therefore, where the commercial speech at issue is both truthful and non-misleading, Sorrell may have the effect of halting a
Central Hudson inquiry as to whether or not the restriction on
speech is justified—deeming speech in aid of pharmaceutical
marketing per se protected expression within the ambit of the
First Amendment.68
As indicated previously, the full effect of the Court’s holding in Sorrell will not be understood until it is applied by lower
courts. Currently pending review in the Second Circuit, U.S. v.
Caronia may be a pivotal ruling for this reason.69 Unlike Sorrell, Caronia specifically deals with the issue of speech vis-à-vis
off-label promotion. Alfred Caronia, a sales representative for
Orphan Medical, Inc., pled guilty to felony misbranding related
to off-label promotion of the drug Xyrem.70 The district court for
the Eastern District of New York refused to dismiss the criminal charges against Caronia—upholding FDA’s off-label ban
under the four-part Central Hudson test—stating that it is
“unable to identify non-speech restrictions that would likely
constrain in any effective way manufacturers from circumventing [the] approval process.”71
Following this holding, it was thought that Caronia would
make it more difficult for pharmaceutical and device manufacturers to prevail in off-label cases on First Amendment grounds
alone.72 However, Sorrell quickly followed Caronia; whether or
not the Second Circuit extends the analysis in Sorrell on review
67. BAKER BOTTS, supra note 6; see also ROPES & GRAY, supra note, at 3
(commenting that the Sorrell holding “plants a stake in the ground firmly on
the side of First Amendment rights”).
68. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659 (“Speech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.”).
69. See Caronia Update: What Went Down at the Oral Argument, DRUG
AND DEVICE LAW (Jan. 21, 2011, 2:15 PM), http://druganddevicelaw
.blogspot.com/2011/01/caronia-update-what-went-down-at-oral.html [hereinafter Caronia Update] (“We’ve blogged about United States v. Caronia before. In
fact, some might say we’re a bit obsessed by it, and with good reason; the First
Amendment’s a big deal to us . . . .”).
70. United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 388–89 (E.D.N.Y.
2008). Xyrem®, also known as sodium oxybate, is a federally-controlled substance approved for the treatment of narcolepsy. Misuse of the drug can have
harmful side effects, especially at high doses. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
MEDICATION GUIDE: XYREM 1–2 (Nov. 18, 2005), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/drugsafety/ucm089830.pdf.
71. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 401.
72. SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 6, at 2.
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to overturn Caronia’s felony conviction may have broad implications for future challenges to FDA regulatory authority. Further challenges on First Amendment grounds in light of Caronia may erode FDA’s ability to use off-label speech as a proxy
for conduct. The relationship between misbranding, regulated
speech, and the conduct FDA seeks to control presents a wide
range of issues that cannot be adequately addressed under the
existing regulatory framework.73 This issue, however, is in
many ways broader than Caronia, and the need to protect the
public from potentially dangerous off-label use undoubtedly
warrants further discussion.
C. THE SPEECH VERSUS CONDUCT DISTINCTION
The inherent problem with off-label promotion is that it
encourages off-label conduct, which is the use of regulated
products outside of their approved indications. Thus, FDA’s
regulatory authority to curb off-label speech does not necessarily strike at the heart of the issue it seeks to resolve:74
A major defect in the FDA’s current restrictive approach to the regulation of off-label promotion is that it reflects the FDA’s decision to
address conduct as to which it had repeatedly expressed concern by
regulating speech endorsing that conduct—and doing so at a categorical level—rather than by regulating the underlying conduct itself.75

This is due, in large part, to statutory constraints on FDA
authority as well as federalism concerns with respect to individual states’ regulation of medical practice with the state.76
FDA’s restriction on commercial speech is one of the few mechanisms available to the Agency to control harmful misuse of
regulated products.77
Off-label promotion is problematic—even that which is
truthful and non-misleading because it arguably encourages
off-label prescribing of products that have not yet demonstrated

73. See, e.g., Klasmeier, supra note 52, at 342–43 (arguing that, despite a
strong public health interest, FDA’s off-label ban is unjustifiable under existing commercial speech doctrine).
74. Id. at 354 (“[W]hile categorically prohibiting promotion of off-label use,
the government has for the most part not restricted off-label use.”).
75. Id. at 335.
76. S. REP. NO. 74-361, at 3 (1935) (stating that the FDCA was “not intended as a medical practices act and [did] not interfere with the practice of
the healing art”).
77. Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 72 (D.D.C.
1998).
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safety and effectiveness as required by FDA.78 Both FDA and
courts have repeatedly acknowledged, however, that FDA does
not have the statutory authority to regulate the practice of
medicine.79 Therefore, though FDA may seek to bar manufacturers from facilitating off-label conduct, the conduct itself is
not unlawful nor within FDA’s regulatory purview. Without the
ability to regulate physician conduct, “the federal government
has limited methods to ensure the quality and necessity of offlabel drug use” in its attempts to secure and promote the public
health.80
Though FDA strongly enforces the ban on off-label promotion, it is both insufficient and impractical to sustain such a
categorical standard in this domain. Further, in light of current
uncertainties posed by Sorrell and Caronia, FDA’s ability to
use speech as a proxy to regulate undesirable conduct may soon
be compromised.81 The speech/conduct distinction then becomes
critical to addressing the regulatory dilemma facing FDA; that
is, how to balance concerns of safety and efficacy with the competing interests of patient care and physician autonomy.82 This
Note will argue that future efforts aimed at curtailing off-label
use should be directed at physician conduct rather than that of
manufacturers. Conduct-based control mechanisms can be expected to play a significant role in future off-label regulation, as
speech-based restrictions are being met with heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. Although this approach will
necessarily require state-level involvement, FDA may not have
many other options pending the outcome of Caronia and other
potential constitutional challenges.

78. Klasmeier, supra note 52, at 332 (“Given the FDA’s determination,
often repeated in the context of off-label use, that new uses are by definition
unsafe and ineffective because they lack FDA approval, the FDA’s position in
the unapproved new drugs context that not all such drugs are unsafe or ineffective is hard to comprehend.”).
79. S. REP. NO. 74-361, at 3 (1935); see also Beck, supra note 13, at 76
(“FDA never has had authority to regulate the practice of medicine . . . .”).
80. Amy E. Todd, No Need for More Regulation: Payors and Their Role in
Balancing the Cost and Safety Considerations of Off-Label Prescriptions, 37
AM. J.L. & MED. 422, 423 (2011).
81. See Caronia Update, supra note 69 (“Caronia represents an opportunity for a Court of Appeals to pass on the constitutionality of FDA’s draconian
and convoluted off-label promotion rules.”).
82. See Stafford, supra note 4, at 1427 (citing both the pros and cons of offlabel prescribing; namely, that access and treatment based on emerging evidence must be adequately weighted against safety considerations).
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D. PHYSICIAN AUTONOMY WITH RESPECT TO OFF-LABEL
PRESCRIBING
Within the bounds of acceptable medical practice, physicians enjoy broad discretion to prescribe any approved product
for off-label use.83 FDA has even recognized that off-label prescribing may, in fact, be the standard of care in some instances.84 The advantages of physician autonomy with respect to offlabel use are fairly straightforward; patients gain earlier access
to treatments and therapies and physicians are allowed “to
adopt new practices based on emerging evidence.”85 Much literature exists regarding the efficacy of off-label uses in treating a
variety of conditions and disease states—published by physicians and often disseminated by manufacturers in support of
such use.86 FDA’s ban on off-label speech has been touted as
obstructing the dissemination of medical literature and emerging evidence to physicians, arguably inhibiting informed decision-making.87
While physicians are of course subject to claims of medical
malpractice, off-label prescribing is not itself evidence of malpractice per se.88 Therefore, the tort system may not provide a
reliable control mechanism with respect to off-label conduct
and is by no means an effective substitute for regulatory oversight.89 Yet because off-label use may constitute the accepted
83. See Mello, supra note 11, at 1557 (emphasizing the fact that physicians may freely prescribe drugs for off-label uses despite the fact that drug
manufacturers may not promote for such uses).
84. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD REPRINT
PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND
MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW
USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES 3
(Jan. 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/FDA2008-D-0053-gdl.pdf (“[O]ff-label uses or treatment regimens may be important and may even constitute a medically recognized standard of care.”).
85. Stafford, supra note 4, at 1427–28 (“[A] key promotional strategy is
providing physicians with journal articles about off-label uses.”).
86. Gregory Conko, Hidden Truth: The Perils and Protections of Off-Label
Drug and Medical Device Promotion, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 149, 150 (2011)
(“[Physicians not paid by a drug or device manufacturer] are free to tout to
benefits of off-label uses in any way to any listener.”).
87. Id. at 151.
88. Todd, supra note 80, at 424 (citing the fact that an off-label drug use is
never conclusive to establish malpractice liability, though off-label prescribing
may be introduced as evidence to substantiate a claim for negligence).
89. But see id. at 439 (arguing that tort liability can effectively “fill the
gaps” where payor or market legislation fails and that the threat of litigation
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standard of care in some fields—oncology, for example—the reverse can also be true for physicians. The American Medical
Association (AMA) has noted that, in some cases, physicians
may be guilty of malpractice for failure to adhere to the offlabel standard of care and has lobbied extensively to preserve
physician autonomy in the interest of patient care.90
In 2007, the AMA passed Resolution 918 reaffirming its
position that the off-label use of FDA-approved drugs and devices, when supported by clinical evidence, expert consensus
opinion, or accepted standards of care, is not only permissible
but encouraged among physicians.91 The resolution lobbies
support for “the autonomous clinical decision-making authority
of a physician” and states that while ongoing research and clinical trials to verify outcomes “should be encouraged and supported,” the lack of such data should not impede off-label use of
regulated products. 92 Further, scientific trials should demonstrate the “clinical benefit” of an off-label use despite the fact
that such trials may not lead to an approved indication.93 Inside of the medical community, many seem to agree with this
position, and argue that regulations should follow—not precede—science and that government should not impede a physician’s ability to practice medicine when an off-label use would
be optimal for patient care.94
Still, vast physician autonomy may compromise the integrity of a uniform approval process, as cited in the New England
Journal of Medicine:
Physicians’ freedom to prescribe drugs off-label carries important advantages. . . . At the same time, off-label use has potentially negative
consequences. It undercuts expectations that drug safety and efficacy
have been fully evaluated. When newer, more expensive drugs are
used off-label, it increases health care costs. It undermines the incentives for manufacturers to perform rigorous studies—and instead subtly encourages them to game the system by seeking approval for sec-

on “failure to warn” claims may be sufficient to keep manufacturers in check).
90. Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose
Off-Label Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 968–69
(2007).
91. AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 918:
PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FDA-APPROVED DRUGS AND MEDICAL DEVICES
OFF-LABEL 1 (2007) (on file with author).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Beck, supra note 13, at 79 (arguing that clinical variation and the
time delay in regulations results in the government impeding or otherwise
hindering the practice of medicine).
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ondary indications for which clinical trials are less complicated and
less expensive. And off-label use may discourage evidence-based practice.95

A 2006 study published in Archives of Internal Medicine
evaluated 725 million prescriptions and found that twenty-one
percent of them were off-label; of that twenty-one percent, seventy-three percent were for a use that lacked any “firm scientific evidence.”96 Though slightly dated, this information bolsters FDA’s argument in favor of greater regulatory controls.
Physicians may, in fact, have misconceptions about the FDA
approval process and the level of evidence supporting a drug’s
indications.97
A survey conducted at the University of Chicago Medical
Center found physicians were more likely to hold the erroneous
belief that a drug has FDA approval for an indication if they
themselves had prescribed it for that particular indication.98
This and related studies demonstrate the potential dangers of
off-label use and highlight the need for greater oversight of prescribing practices relative to such risks.99 Because regulating
the practice of medicine is traditionally a space wholly reserved
for states, state involvement is required to scrutinize off-label
prescribing practices.100
II. ANALYSIS
A. THE CASE FOR STATE INVOLVEMENT: WHY REIMBURSEMENT
ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT TO CURTAIL OFF-LABEL PRACTICES
It is widely argued that curbing reimbursement for unapproved uses will reduce off-label activity and, in fact, promote

95. Stafford, supra note 4, at 1427–28.
96. David Radley, Stan Finkelstein & Randall Stafford, Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 66 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1021,
1023 (2006).
97. Rick Nauert, Off-Label Use May be Off-Track, PSYCH CENTRAL (Aug.
24, 2009), http://psychcentral.com/news/2009/08/24/off-label-use-may-be-offtrack/7926.html.
98. Id.; see also Evans, supra note 24 (“Most physicians don’t keep track of
FDA-approved uses of drugs . . . .”).
99. Todd, supra note 80, at 426 (discussing the risks associated with offlabel use) (“[W]hile off-label prescribing can be very beneficial to some patients, this common practice can also be unnecessary and, in some cases, very
risky.”).
100. Id. at 429.
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health care cost containment.101 Third-party payor reimbursement decisions for off-label prescriptions purport to act as a
proxy for regulatory oversight, dissuading physicians (and their
patients) from off-label use.102 In light of current regulatory uncertainties, this alternative seems much more capable of curtailing off-label use than enforcing a ban on promotion—even to
the tune of $2.3 billion.103 Yet due to the benefits of off-label
prescribing, many states have actually done the exact opposite—enacting legislation requiring insurers to cover off-label
prescriptions for certain conditions such as cancer.104
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
make up the largest payor of health care costs in the country.105
CMS has made national coverage decisions have been made to
reimburse those services deemed “reasonable and necessary”
pursuant to requirements of the Social Security Act.106 The
“reasonable and necessary” standard is not, however, a corollary to FDA’s “safe and effective” benchmark requirement.107
As a result, CMS routinely reimburses off-label use of regulated
products.108 Thus, because CMS coverage decisions heavily influence the coverage decisions of private third-party payors,
mandates alone are unlikely to curtail off-label use.109 This is
true for several reasons, namely: 1) CMS coverage decisions are
not binding across localities, though national coverage decisions preempt state mandates; 2) self-insured plans are exempt
from state mandates under the Employee Retirement Income
101. Id. at 422–23.
102. Id.
103. See generally Evans, supra note 24 (discussing the recidivism of “Big
Pharma” with respect to off-label activity despite the possibility of excessive
fines and penalties being imposed by the government).
104. 2006 Prescription Drug Legislation, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGS. (March
2009),
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/archive-2006-prescriptiondrug-state-legislation.aspx.
105. MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY,
app. B 8 (March 2003), available at: http://www.medpac.gov/documents
/mar03_entire_report.pdf.
106. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“[N]o payment
shall be made . . . for any items or services . . . which . . . are not are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to
improve the functioning of a malformed body member.”).
107. See id.
108. See, e.g., Todd, supra note 80, at 428, 434 (commenting that Medicare
recently relaxed rules regarding payment for certain types of off-label cancer
treatments).
109. See id. at 434 (“Most private insurers base their reimbursement models on Medicare’s rules.”).
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Security Act (ERISA); and 3) the practice of medicine directly
influences reimbursement; therefore, regulating the practice of
medicine itself is sufficient to affect coverage determinations.110
1. Coverage Decisions Are Not Binding Across Localities
National Coverage Determinations (NCDs), administered
by the Agency’s national office, are usually reserved for items
and services that affect a large number of beneficiaries.111
NCDs cannot vary by region and all contractors are required to
comply with such coverage decisions.112 While NCDs are binding, the majority of coverage decisions are made at the local
level through regional contractors.113 The country is divided into eleven regions, and each regional contractor issues its own
Local Coverage Determinations (LCDs)—stipulating covered
items and services for that jurisdiction.114 If a contractor serves
multiple jurisdictions, uniform LCDs are encouraged.115 However, a regional LCD by one contractor does not necessarily affect nor influence the LCD of another.116 Contractors can develop their own LCDs for “reasonable and necessary” services not
yet addressed by national determinations—making it especially
difficult to regulate reimbursement for off-label uses.117
It is not uncommon that five or more LCDs apply to the
same product or procedure.118 Moreover, national coverage decisions are federally regulated and preempt both regional decisions as well as state mandates either in favor of or against offlabel use.119 Such evidence-based determinations typically influence the coverage decisions of other payors, despite the fact
that “reasonable and necessary” does not apply to private parties.120 It follows, then, that constraining off-label coverage at
110. See id. at 434–38 (“While physicians have the ability to prescribe offlabel as they wish without governmental interference, the prospect of nonpayment will guide how doctors practice medicine.”).
111. MEDPAC, supra note 105, at 246.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 245.
114. Id. at 247.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Todd, supra note 80, at 434 (“Most private insurers base their reimbursement models on Medicare’s rules.”).

015 ZBOROWSKY_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

7/5/2012 1:29 PM

RETHINKING OFF-LABEL REGULATION

943

the state level would necessarily require multi-state cooperation and CMS involvement. This approach seems unlikely given the fact that even though both CMS and FDA belong to the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and could,
logically, join forces to impose the off-label ban, neither agency
has elected to pursue this option. For private payors, ERISA
preemption renders self-insured plans immune to state coverage mandates and further complicates such tactics.121
2. ERISA Preemption for Self-Insured Plans Compromises
Efficacy
With self-insured plans, large employers can administer
their own benefits as they have enough employees to create a
solvent risk pool.122 Typically, a self-insured employer will establish a special trust to pay any incurred claims.123 The employer assumes liability for all payments, rather than purchasing health coverage at a premium from a third-party carrier.124
According to a recent study, nearly forty-seven million American employees receive health benefits from some form of selfinsured plan.125 Because the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) regulates such plans—placing them outside
the realm of state control—the sheer number of insured may be
sufficient to render coverage mandates both impractical and ineffective.126
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ap-

121. See id. at 437–38.
122. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT ON SELF-INSURED GROUP
HEALTH PLANS (2011) at ii–1, available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ACA
ReportToCongress032811.pdf; Patricia Butler, ERISA Implications for State
Health Care Access Initiatives: Impact of the Maryland “Fair Share Act” Court
COVERAGE
INITIATIVES
(Nov.
2006),
Decision,
STATE
http://www.statecoverage.org/node/170 (follow “ERISA Implications . . .” hyperlink) (describing the applicability of ERISA to state health care initiatives
aimed at employer-based income subsidies).
123. Butler, supra note 122.
124. Id.
125. See id. This report contains general information regarding self-insured
employee health benefit plans and financial information regarding the sponsoring employers as required by The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010. See also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
126. Todd, supra note 80, at 429 (noting that states may act to control offlabel use, though “[t]he Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), a
federal statute, preempts any state legislation. Consequently, these insurance
mandate statutes are vulnerable to an ERISA challenge.”) (citation omitted).
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plies to pensions and other benefits programs, such as health
insurance, sponsored by private employers.127 Under ERISA,
states cannot deem employee benefit plans as insurers and are
prohibited from regulating such plans directly.128 A state law
will be preempted by ERISA if it: 1) “[r]efers to an ERISA plan,
either explicitly or by requiring reference to an ERISA plan in
order to comply with the state law” or 2) “[h]as a connection
with an ERISA plan by substantially affecting its benefits, administration, or structure.”129 Therefore, state mandates banning coverage for off-label usage would not extend to selfinsured plans—a significant and growing number of the country’s total insured population—and, for this reason, cannot provide a viable alternative to the current regulatory scheme nor
its proposed alternatives.130 The Practice of Medicine Directly
Influences Reimbursement
Though ERISA challenges may render a reimbursement
model impracticable, state regulation of off-label prescribing
could potentially have the analogous effect of influencing coverage decisions and is not constrained or preempted by any federal statutes. A payor reimbursement model may, in fact, induce physicians to comport with established standards;
however, theoretically, the model should work both ways. Just
as the prospect of nonpayment will guide physician decisionmaking, payors also have a strong incentive to decrease costs
and eliminate unnecessary or investigational usage.131 In establishing formularies132 or compendia,133 frequency of use and
acceptable standards of care may impact a payor’s coverage determination.134 For example, if physicians in Ohio are prohibit127. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93–
406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2006)).
128. Butler, supra note 122, at 3–4.
129. Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
130. See Todd, supra note 80, at 438 (stating that limitations to state mandates are inherent due to ERISA preemption).
131. See id. at 434–35.
132. A formulary is a list of drugs that is preferred by a health insurance
plan. Michael Bihari, Understanding Your Health Plan Drug Formulary,
ABOUT.COM (Feb. 25, 2010), http://healthinsurance.about.com/od/prescrip
tiondrugs/a/understanding_formulary.htm.
133. In the medical context, a compendium is a guide for drug administration for the treatment of disease. See NCCN Drugs & Biologics Compendium,
NAT’L COMPREHENSIVE CANCER NETWORK, http://www.nccn.org/professionals/
drug_compendium/content/contents.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
134. See Todd, supra note 80, at 435.
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ed from prescribing mifepristone off-label, there is no reason for
carriers serving the region to reimburse for such use.135 Moreover—though the law was struck down on First Amendment
grounds—prohibiting pharmaceutical detailing to curb state
healthcare costs was fundamental to the Vermont statute in
Sorrell; this bolsters the argument that the practice of medicine
can directly influence reimbursement.136
Though some coverage decisions are made on a case-bycase basis, widespread state law restrictions of physician offlabel prescribing may act to effectively curtail off-label activity
from a purely economic perspective.137 Some combination of reimbursement and other state-based controls—regulating the
practice of medicine being one such option—may work in tandem to curtail intra-state off-label activity and have the potential to be adopted by neighboring states if successful. A lack or
decline in FDA regulatory power need not impart the issues of
off-label control, safety, and cost containment decisions into the
hands of private parties.138
B. CORDRAY V. PLANNED PARENTHOOD: REGULATING OFF-LABEL
CONDUCT THROUGH THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
A recent case out of Ohio has grappled with the issue of offlabel use in regulating the practice of medicine. Outside of the
context of abortion policy and reproductive rights, the case may
be illustrative of the ways in which state-based controls can be
leveraged to accomplish Agency goals.
1. Off-label Prohibition in the State of Ohio: Examining
Cordray
In 2009, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a statute prohib-

135. See discussion infra Part II.B.
136. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653.
137. See Todd, supra note 80, at 434–35 (“[T]he prospect of nonpayment
will guide how doctors practice medicine.”). Perhaps a case study of health
care trends in states with similar laws (e.g., Ohio) is needed to examine the
efficacy of such a model. However, it is without a doubt that state involvement
in this realm is necessary. See generally Dresser, supra note (concluding that
some regulation of the medical profession itself will be necessary to tackle the
problem of off-label use).
138. Todd, supra note 80, at 429 (contemplating the best way to address
the inherent risks in off-label use and arguing that the private market may
also be capable of regulating off-label activity through other mechanisms, particularly where state and federal laws are susceptible to preemption or constitutional challenge).
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iting the use of mifepristone139 (“RU-486”) outside of its approved indication.140 Local providers, including Planned
Parenthood, challenged the constitutionality of R.C. 2919.123,
which required in part that in order to prescribe RU-486 a physician must satisfy “all the criteria established by federal law . .
. in accordance with all provisions of federal law that govern
the use of RU-486 (mifepristone) for inducing abortions.”141 The
statute defined federal law as “any law, rule, or regulation of
the United States or any drug approval letter of the food and
drug administration of the United States that governs or regulates the use of RU-486 (mifepristone) for the purpose of inducing abortion.”142
Planned Parenthood asserted that “neither the FDA’s approval letter nor any other provision of federal law prohibit[ed]
abortion providers from using” RU-486 off-label.143 However, in
determining how to construe the plain language of the statute,
the state’s highest court held that the law effectively requires
physicians to administer RU-486 in compliance with dosage indications and treatment protocols found in both the FDA approval letter and all labeling materials.144 Though the dissenting opinion in this case argues that federal law does not
specifically limit the use of RU-486 outside of the forty-nineday gestational limit due to the fact that FDA cannot regulate
the practice of medicine, the statute survived constitutional
challenge as the plain language of R.C. 2919.123 was found to
impose this limit—effectively regulating the practice of medicine in Ohio.145
Therefore, while FDA-approved indications cannot be construed to limit medical judgment, states have the authority to
regulate the practice of medicine and may enact legislation

139. Mifepristone, also known as RU-486, is indicated for use in the termination of pregnancy through 49 days of gestation—commonly referred to as a
medical abortion—and has no other FDA-approved indication for use during
pregnancy. Cordray v. Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region, 911 N.E.2d
871, 874 (2009).
140. Id. at 873.
141. Id. at 875 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.123(F)(1) (LexisNexis
2010)).
142. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.123(F)(1) (LexisNexis 2010).
143. Cordray, 911 N.E.2d at 876.
144. Id. at 877–78.
145. See id. at 879, 881.
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forcing compliance with such indications.146 Further, though
Planned Parenthood challenged the constitutionality of the
Ohio statute on grounds that it unduly burdens patients’ rights
to an abortion, legislation of this type need not be so restrictive.147 Off-label restrictions can, in fact, accommodate orphan
conditions and other disease states while simultaneously enabling states to curtail harmful misuse of regulated products.
State-based controls on off-label use may serve as a more appropriate way to curb undesirable activity—removing manufacturers from the equation altogether.148
2. The Practicality of Trading FDA Oversight for State-based
Controls
Though this model is not without its flaws, the nature of
the state legislative process is able to mitigate some of the issues it presents. Patient advocacy groups—as well as other
special interest groups—may lobby for exceptions. State legislation can be “narrowly tailored” to address specific off-label activity that may be of particular concern, such as the controversial use of Avastin.149 Additionally, as with the Ohio law, state
legislation regulating off-label use via the practice of medicine
may be less susceptible to constitutional challenges—
particularly where statutory language is express.150
Balancing concerns of patient care and physician autonomy
with the broader goal of safeguarding public health may, how146. See Beck, supra note 13, at 76–77; Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal
Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (stating that off-label use “is an accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate in this area without directly
interfering with the practice of medicine”).
147. Cordray, 911 N.E.2d at 875–76.
148. See Todd, supra note 80, at 429 (commenting that a lack of federal
regulatory power leaves ample room for state involvement, particularly where
a strong state interest, such as public safety, is at stake).
149. Avastin, or bevacizumab, was developed by Genentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc. for the treatment of certain types of cancers. The drug is also currently used off-label to treat a form of macular degeneration. In late 2011 FDA
Commissioner Margaret Hamburg announced that the Agency would withdraw approval of Avastin to treat metastatic breast cancer due to high risk of
death from stroke, heart attack, or serious bleeding. The product remains on
the market for the treatment of other cancers such as kidney, lung, and colon
cancer. While the decision was incredibly controversial, the withdrawal of an
indication does not prevent oncologists from using the drug to treat breast
cancer patients. See Shari Roan, Avastin Loses Approval as Breast Cancer
Drug (Nov. 18, 2011) L. A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2011, at A9.
150. See generally Cordray, 911 N.E.2d at 877 (asserting that the legislative intent in enacting the statute at issue was clear and unambiguous).
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ever, prove difficult with this model. Legislation of this type
would require multi-state cooperation to ensure successful curtailing of off-label activity. Otherwise, residents could simply
travel to states with fewer or more favorable off-label restrictions, defeating the intended efficacy of state-based controls. The most likely hurdles to adopting such state-based controls are consistency and contiguity. State legislatures will
undoubtedly respond to intra-state pressures that may or may
not coincide with the goals and interests of other—even neighboring—states. Michigan, for example, has no compelling reason to impose a similar ban on mifepristone as exists in Ohio,
and so on.
Though widespread implementation of state-based controls
will certainly prove difficult initially, state legislation of this
type may be the only reliable way to curtail off-label activity in
the wake of constitutional challenges to FDA’s authority to do
so. Waning federal regulatory power with respect to off-label
promotion can only be compensated at the state level unless
Congress elects to amend the existing regulatory scheme.151
Moreover, the commonly proposed alternative of reimbursement is, by itself, insufficient to effectively regulate off-label
use.152
CONCLUSION
With pending constitutional challenges to FDA regulatory
authority, the existing ban on off-label promotion may soon lose
its ability to accomplish Agency goals. Yet, as one scholar notes:
Invalidating the prohibition on off-label promotion would not affect
the FDA’s requirement that a drug be approved by the agency before
it can be sold in interstate commerce. Once a drug was approved as
safe and effective for one use, however, its manufacturer would be
free to promote it for any other use. Regulators and prosecutors would
be limited to policing manufacturer speech after-the-fact on a case-bycase basis. This is problematic because it would be ineffective . . . .
Given medicine’s high stakes, it is neither surprising nor unconstitutional that that the prophylacticrule that governs drug claims sup-

151. See Dresser supra note 30, at 476 (2009) (arguing that members of
Congress should recognize a more affirmative role for government oversight in
deterring inappropriate off-label prescribing).
152. Todd, supra note 80, at 442–43 (“The medical community must improve the quality and dissemination of information relied upon in order for
payors to make informed evidence-based reimbursement decisions, and for the
payor-centric enforcement model to be effective.”).
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presses some truthful speech.153

In the event that Sorrell is interpreted to diminish authority in this realm, it seems unlikely that Congress will amend the
existing statutory scheme to widen the scope of FDA’s regulatory power.154 As such, state laws pertaining to off-label prescribing and reimbursement are alternate regulatory pathways that
should be explored in the interest of public health.
While state-based controls may be impractical to implement on a sufficiently-large scale to impact off-label activity,
few options remain to impose the sort of categorical ban that
FDA ostensibly deems necessary to protect consumers. Still, in
the wake of cases like Sorrell and Caronia, additional regulatory alternatives become imperative. Manufacturers are sure to
pursue constitutional challenges to FDA’s restriction of off-label
promotion, driven largely by the potential profit margin—a
regulatory approach that wholly eliminates manufacturers is
desirable. Unless congressional action is taken, this is not possible at the federal level. For the time being, then, state-based
controls may serve as an option to resolve current regulatory
uncertainties.

153. Kate Greenwood, The Ban on “Off-Label” Pharmaceutical Promotion:
Constitutionally Permissible Prophylaxis Against False or Misleading Commercial Speech?, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 278, 297–98 (2011) (citations omitted).
154. See Conko, supra note 86, at 184–85 (“In an extreme alternative proposal, Congress could merely forbid doctors from using drugs and devices for
off-label indications . . . [d]oing so would necessarily ‘inject[] Congress and the
federal government directly into the practice of medicine,’ an area historically
outside the reach of FDA’s authority.”) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).

